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ABSTRACT
We consider a mechanism design problem for energy
procurement, when there is one buyer and one seller,
and the buyer is the mechanism designer. The seller
can generate energy from conventional (deterministic) and
renewable (random) plants, and has multi-dimensional
private information which determines her production cost.
The objective is to maximize the buyer’s utility under
the constraint that the seller voluntarily participates in the
energy procurement process. We show that the optimal
mechanism is a menu of contracts (nonlinear pricing) that
the buyer offers to the seller, and the seller chooses one
based on her private information.
Keywords: integration of renewable energy, optimal
contract, energy procurement, multi-dimensional private
information, mechanism design.
I. INTRODUCTION
The intermittent nature of modern renewable energy
resources makes the integration of modern renewable
energy generation into the current designed infrastructure
for conventional energy generation a challenging problem.
Electricity generation from modern renewable energy re-
sources is not predetermined and cannot be treated as con-
ventional generation. Energy generation from wind, solar,
and other modern renewable energy resources depends on
the weather and is stochastic. This feature results in many
technical issues in reliability and stability in generation
and transmission, as well as market structure.
Currently, modern renewable energy generators that
participate in the regular real-time power market, that is
originally designed for conventional generators, are treated
as negative loads on the grid, and receive subsidy for each
kWh they deliver [6], [7]. Due to the increasing share
of wind power in energy markets, independent system
operators (ISOs) gradually require wind power plants to
participate in the day-ahead market, to commit to a fixed
amount of generation, and to pay a penalty for each KWh
they fail to provide [15].
Along with the current approach, the proposed structure
of the smart grid creates additional opportunities to inte-
grate conventional and modern renewable energy resources
via flexible loads connected to the grid.
The challenges that arise in the market aspect of the
integration of renewable and conventional energy re-
sources motivate the problem formulated and studied in
this paper. We follow the current approach for integration
of conventional and modern renewable energy resources.
This approach requires modern renewable generators to
behave as firm power plants that participate in the day-
ahead market (in general, a forward market) and commit
to producing a predetermined amount of electricity in
advance. We want to incorporate new features into our
problem formulation, which are mainly motivated by the
following observations: (1) Currently, modern renewable
generators are paid at a fixed rate, receive subsidy, and
do not take any risk, therefore, no strategic behavior is
considered. However, as the share of modern renewable
generation increases and supportive programs for modern
renewable energy decreases, the market becomes more
competitive and participants behave strategically. (2) The
cost of energy generation varies from 60 to 250 ($/MWh)
due to the different technologies that are available at
wind power plants [16]. These technologies are the plants’
private information. Because modern renewable generators
have private production cost and behave strategically, the
current market structure, where renewable generators are
paid at a fixed rate, receive subsidies, and all the produced
electricity is guaranteed to be procured at the real-time
market with no risk, is inefficient.
In this paper we consider a model for integration of
conventional and modern renewable energy sources with
the following features: (F1) Energy market participants
are strategic. (F2) The energy seller has the ability to
produce both modern renewable and conventional energy.
(F3) Energy producers may have different technologies for
renewable and conventional energy generation which are
their own private information.
By considering a seller with generation capabilities
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2from both conventional and modern renewable energy
resources, we postulate a possible future scenario in which
the integration of modern renewable and conventional
generation is partly done by sellers and the ISO is not
fully responsible for the integration. Our model captures
the current approach to the integration of conventional and
modern renewable energy resources, that considers sellers
with only modern renewable generation capability, if we
set the cost of conventional generation to be fixed and
equal to the penalty rate for each KWh producers fail to
provide.
A. Literature Review
Research on resource allocation and resource manage-
ment with uncertainty in energy markets has addressed two
types of problems: (1) Those which follow the smart grid
approach and focus on the demand side with strategic (e.g.
[8]) or non-strategic agents (e.g. [13]). (2) Those where
the focus is on the supply side and energy providers face
uncertainties in their production.
The problem formulated in this paper belongs to the
second class where energy providers are strategic and
have private information about their own cost and tech-
nology. Research on this class of problems has appeared
in [3],[5],[1], and [18]. The work in [3] considers a given
uncertain demand and investigates a multi-dimensional
auction mechanism for the forward reserved market as-
suming that the participants have no market power and
the equilibrium price is not affected by each individual
participant’s behavior. The idea of selling uncertain (ran-
dom) power to consumers is investigated in [17] and [5].
The problems studied in [1] and [18] consider modern
renewable generation and are the most closely related
works to the problem we consider here. The work in [1]
considers a modern renewable generator with stochastic
generation and determines the optimal bidding policy for
it in the day-ahead market. The authors of [1] assume
that price is given and fixed, so there is no role for a
buyer, and there is a penalty for production deficiency and
over production. The work in [18] considers a problem
where an ISO wants to procure energy from modern
renewable generators with the assumption that generation
from renewable energy resources is free and each gener-
ator has private information about the probability density
function of its generation; a VCG-based mechanism is pro-
posed for the optimal energy procurement. The proposed
VCG-based mechanism is suboptimal for the problem
formulated in [18] when the probability distribution for
the generation cannot be parameterized by only a one-
dimensional variable (see [9], chapter 14).
From the economics point of view, the problem we for-
mulate in this paper belongs to the class of screening prob-
lems. In economics, the one-dimensional screening prob-
lem has been well-studied with both linear and nonlinear
utility functions [2]. However, the extension to the multi-
dimensional screening problem is not straightforward and
there is no general solution to it. The authors in [10]
study a general framework for a static multi-dimensional
screening problem with linear utility. They discuss two
general approaches, the parametric-utility approach and
the demand-profile approach. The methodology we use
to solve the problem formulated in this paper is similar
to the demand-profile approach. We consider a multi-
dimensional screening problem with nonlinear utilities.
The presence of nonlinearities results in additional com-
plications which are not present in [10] where the utilities
are linear1.
B. Contribution
The contribution of this paper is two-fold. First, we
introduce a model that captures key features of the current
approach for the integration of modern renewable energy
sources into the grid, and postulate a possible broader role
for sellers in the future. We consider a strategic seller that
has the capability to produce energy from modern renew-
able and conventional resources. To our knowledge, this
is the first model that considers simultaneously both types
of electricity generation. As we discuss below, considering
both modern renewable and conventional generation with
a general production cost results in a multi-dimensional
mechanism design problem which is conceptually different
from the one-dimensional screening problem that arises
when there is only one type of energy resource with
simple production cost. The model proposed in this paper
captures the scenarios investigated in [18] and [1] as
special cases; in [1] and [18] the seller owns only modern
renewable generators with free generation and is penalized
for production mismatch.
Second, we determine the optimal mechanism for en-
ergy procurement from a strategic seller with multi-
dimensional private information satisfying both interim
and ex-post voluntary participation of the seller. Because
of the random nature of renewable energy generation,
interim voluntary participation of the seller does not
necessarily imply ex-post voluntary participation. To our
knowledge, our results present the first optimal mechanism
for a strategic seller with conventional and renewable gen-
eration, and multi-dimensional private information which
also guarantees the seller’s ex-post voluntary participation.
We show that the current linear pricing for modern renew-
1When a problem is linear, expectation of any random variable can be
replaced by its expected value and reduce the problem to a deterministic
one.
3able energy generation is not efficient and that the optimal
pricing method is a nonlinear scheme.
C. Organization
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we
introduce the model and formulate the energy procurement
problem. In section 3, we present an outline of our
approach and the key ideas toward the solution of the
problem formulated in section 2, and state the main result
on the optimal mechanism for energy procurement. We
illustrate the result by an example in section 4. We discuss
the nature of our results in section 5. We extend our
results to the energy procurement problem without full
commitment for the seller, and propose an optimal contract
with arbitrary risk allocation between the buyer and the
seller in section 6. We conclude in section 7.
II. MODEL SPECIFICATION AND PROBLEM
FORMULATION
A. Model Specification
A buyer wishes to make an agreement to buy energy
from an energy seller2. The seller has the ability to produce
energy from conventional (deterministic) generators or
from renewable (random) generators that she owns.
Let q be the amount of energy the buyer buys, and
t be his payment to the seller. We proceed to formulate
the energy procurement problem by making the following
assumptions.
(A1) The buyer is risk-neutral and his total utility is
given by V(q) − t, where V(q) is the utility that he gets
from receiving q amount of energy, and V(0) = 0. V(·) is
the buyer’s private information3.
(A2) The seller’s production cost is given by C(q, w, x),
where x∈χ⊆Rn is the seller’s type (technology and cost)
and w denotes the realization of a random variable W , e.g.
weather. C(q, w, x) is convex and increasing in q. The
start-up cost C(0, w, x) does not depend on the weather
w and is given by x1, i.e. C(0, w, x)=C(0, x)=x1.
(A3) The probability distribution function of W , i.e.
weather forecast, is common knowledge between the buyer
and the seller and is given by FW (w).
(A4) The seller is risk-neutral and her utility is given
by her total expected revenue
EW {t− C(q,W, x)} . (1)
2From now on, we refer to the buyer as “he” and to the seller as “she”.
3We assume that the buyer either has an elastic demand, or needs to
meet some fixed demand and has an outside option to buy energy if he
cannot buy it from the seller (which is the result of his interaction with
other players in the market).
(A5) Define c(q, x) = ∂EW {C(q,W,x)}∂q as the expected
marginal cost for the seller’s type x. Without loss of
generality, there exists m, 1 <m ≤ n, such that c(q, x)
is increasing in xi for 1≤i≤m, and decreasing in xi for
m<i≤n. Moreover, there is an x∈χ (the seller’s worst
type) such that xi≤xi and xj≥xj for all x∈χ, 1≤i≤m
and m<j≤n.
(A6) The seller’s type x is her own private information,
the set χ is common knowledge, and there is a prior
probability distribution fX over χ which is common
knowledge between the buyer and the seller.
(A7) Both the buyer and the seller are strategic and
perfectly rational, and this is common knowledge.
(A8) The buyer has all the bargaining power; thus, he
can design the mechanism/set of rules that determines
the agreement for energy procurement quantity q, and
payment t4.
(A9) After the buyer announces the mechanism for
energy procurement and the seller accepts it, both the
buyer and the seller are fully committed to following the
rules of the mechanism.
As a consequence of assumption (A8) on the buyer’s
bargaining power and the fact that the seller’s utility does
not directly depend on the buyer’s private information,
the solution of the problem formulated in this paper does
not depend on whether the buyer’s utility V(·) is private
information or common knowledge5.
Note that in the one-dimensional screening problem,
the cost of production induces a complete order among
the seller’s types, which is crucial to the solution to the
optimal mechanism design problem. However, in multi-
dimensional screening problems, the expected cost of
production induces, in general, only a partial order among
the seller’s types.
Definition 1. We say the seller’s type x is better (resp.
worse) than the seller’s type xˆ if EW {C(q,W, x)} ≤
EW {C(q,W, xˆ)} for all q≥0 (resp. EW {C(q,W, x)}≥
EW {C(q,W, xˆ)}) with strict inequality for some q.
From (A5), the seller’s type x is better than the seller’s
type xˆ if and only if xi≤xˆi for 1≤i≤m, and xi≥xˆi for
m<i≤n with strict inequality for some i. The following
4The buyer is either an ISO or a representative agent for aggregate
demand. In the first case, it is realistic to assume that the ISO has all the
bargaining power since he is the designer and the regulator of the energy
market. In the later case, usually there is no competition on the demand
side, but different sellers compete to win a contract with the demand side.
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that in a non-cooperative setting,
the demand side has all the bargaining power.
5This becomes more clear by looking at the main result given by
Theorem 1.
4example illustrates assumption (A2)-(A5) and Definition
1.
A simple case. Consider a seller with a wind turbine and
a gas generator. The generation from the wind turbine is
free and given by γw3, where γ is the turbine’s technology
and w is the realized weather. The gas generator has a fixed
marginal cost θc. We assume that there is a fixed cost c0
which includes the start-up cost for both plants and the
capital cost for the seller. Therefore, the seller’s type has
n = 3 dimensions. The generation cost for the seller is
given by
C(q, w, x) = c0 + θcmax
{
q − γw3, 0} (2)
The seller’s type x = (c0, θc, γ) is better than the seller’s
type xˆ = (cˆ0, θˆc, γˆ) if and only if c0 ≤ cˆ0, θc ≤ θˆc, and
γ ≥ γˆ with one of the above inequalities being strict.
B. Problem Formulation
Let (M, h) be the mechanism/game form (see [11], Ch.
23) for energy procurement designed by the buyer. In this
game form, M describes the message/strategy space and
h determines the outcome function; h : M → R+ × R
is such that for every message/action m ∈M it specifies
the amount q of procured energy and the payment t made
to the seller, i.e. h(m) = (q(m), t(m)) = (q, t).
The objective is to determine a mechanism (M, h) so
as to
maximize
(M,(q,t))
EX,W {V(q)− t} (3)
under assumptions (A1)-(A9) and the constraint that the
seller is willing to voluntarily participate in the energy
procurement process. The willingness of the seller to vol-
untarily participate in the mechanism for energy procure-
ment is called voluntary participation (VP) (or individual
rationality) and is written as
VP: t(m∗)− EW {C(q(m∗),W, x)} ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ χ (4)
where m∗ ∈M is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) of
the game induced by the mechanism (M, h). That is, at
equilibrium the seller has a non-negative payoff.
We call the above problem (P1).
III. OUTLINE OF THE APPROACH & RESULTS
We prove that the optimal energy procurement mech-
anism is a pricing scheme that the buyer offers to the
seller and the seller chooses a production quantity based on
her type. We characterize the optimal energy procurement
mechanism by the following theorem, which reduces the
original functional maximization problem (P1) to a set of
equivalent point-wise maximization problems.
Theorem 1. The optimal mechanism (q, t) for the buyer
is a menu of contracts (nonlinear pricing) given by
p(q) = argmax
pˆ
{P [x ∈ χ|pˆ ≥ c(q, x)] (V ′(q)− pˆ)}, (5)
t(q) =
∫ q
0
p(l)dl + C(0, x), (6)
q(x) = arg max
l∈R+
E {t (l)− EW {C(l, x, w)}} (7)
where V ′(q) := dV(q)dq .
The proof of theorem 1 proceeds is several steps. Below
we present these steps and the key ideas behind each step.
The detailed proof of all results (theorems and lemmas)
appearing below can be found in the appendix.
Step 1. By invoking the revelation principle [4], we
restrict attention, without loss of optimality, to direct rev-
elation mechanisms that are incentive compatible (defined
below) and individually rational.
Definition 2. A direct revelation mechanism is defined by
functions q : χ → R+ and t : χ → R+, and works
as follows: First, the buyer announces functions q and t.
Second, the seller declares some x′ ∈ χ as her report for
her technology and cost. Third, the seller is paid t(x′) to
deliver q(x′) amount of energy.
The seller is strategic and may lie and misreport her
private information x, i.e. we do not necessarily have x′ =
x unless it is to the seller’s interest to report truthfully.
We call incentive compatibility (IC) the requirement for
truthful reporting, and define the following problem that
is equivalent to (P1).
Problem P2: Determine functions q : χ → R+ and
t : χ→ R+ so as to
maximize
(q,t)
Ex,W {V(q(x))− t(x)} (8)
subject to
IC : x=argmax
x′
EW [t(x′)−C(q(x′), w, x)] ,∀x∈χ (9)
V P : EW [t(x)− C(q(x),W, x)] ≥ 0, ∀x∈χ. (10)
Step 2. We utilize the partial order among the seller’s
different types to rank the seller’s utility for her different
types, and reduce the VP constraint for all the seller’s
types to the VP constraint only for the seller’s worst type.
Lemma 1. For a given mechanism (q, t), a better type
of the seller gets a higher utility. That is, let U(x) :=
EW {t(q(x))− C(q(x),W, x)} denote the expected profit
of the seller with type x. Then,
1) ∂U∂xi ≤ 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
2) ∂U∂xi ≥ 0,m < i ≤ n.
5A direct consequence of Lemma 4, is that the seller’s
worst type x receives the minimum utility among all the
seller’s types.
Corollary 1. The voluntary participation constraint is
only binding for the worst type x, that is the general VP
constraint (7) can be reduced to
U(x) := E {t(q(x))− C(q(x), w, x)} = 0. (11)
Step 3. We show, via Lemma 2 below, that without loss
of optimality, we can restrict attention to a set of functions
t(·) that depend only on the amount of energy q. That is,
the optimal mechanism is a pricing scheme.
Lemma 2. For any pair of functions (q, t) that satisfies
the IC constraint, we can rewrite t(x′) as t (q(x′)).
Step 4. As a consequence of Lemma 5, we determine an
optimal mechanism sequentially. First, we determine the
optimal payment function t(·), then the optimal energy
procurement function q(·). For any function t(·), we de-
termine, for each type x of the seller, the optimal quantity
q∗(x) that she wishes to produce as
q∗(x) = argmax
l
EW {t (l)− C(l, w, x)} . (12)
Incentive compatibility then requires that the seller must
tell the truth to achieve this optimal value, and cannot
do better by lying, i.e. q(x) = q∗(x) for all x ∈ χ.
For any function t(·), this last equality can be taken as
the definition for the associated function q(·). Thus, we
eliminate the IC constraint by defining q(·) := q∗(·) and
reduce the problem of designing the optimal direct revela-
tion mechanism (q, t) to an equivalent problem where we
determine only the optimal payment function t(·) subject
to the voluntary participation constraint for the worst type.
Step 5. To solve this new equivalent problem, we
write the buyer’s expected utility as the integration of his
marginal expected utility, and express the marginal ex-
pected utility in terms of the marginal price p(q) := ∂t(q)∂q
and the minimum payment t(0) (which along with p(·)
uniquely determines the payment function t(·)). Specifi-
cally, in the appendix we show that
EX[V(q∗(X))]−EX[t(q∗(X))]=∫∞
0
P (x ∈ χ|q∗(x)≥l)V ′(l)dl
−t(0)−∫∞
0
P (x∈χ|q∗(x)≥l) p(l)dl, (13)
where V ′(q) := dV(q)dq . That is, the buyer’s total expected
utility is obtained by integrating his marginal utility at
quantity l, times the probability that the seller’s production
exceeds l, and subtracting the minimum payment t(0). We
show in the appendix that the seller’s optimal decision
q∗(x) depends only on the marginal price p(q). Thus,
we can write the probability associated with the seller’s
decision as
P (x ∈ χ|q∗(x) ≥ l) = P [x ∈ χ|p(l) ≥ c(l, x)] . (14)
That is, the seller is willing to produce the marginal
quantity at l if the resulting expected marginal profit is
positive, i.e. marginal price p(l) exceeds marginal expected
cost of generation c(l, x)6. Using (46) and (14), we define
the following problem that is equivalent to (P2) and is
in terms of the marginal price p(q) and the minimum
payment t(0).
Problem P3:
max
p(·),t(0)
∫ ∞
0
P [x∈χ|p(l)≥c(l, x)](V ′(l)−p(l))dl−t(0)(15)
subject to
VP: EW
{
t(0)+
∫ q(x)
0
p(r)dr − C(q∗(x), w, x)
}
≥0.(16)
Step 6. We provide a ranking for the seller’s optimal
decision q∗(x) based on the partial order among the
seller’s types.
Lemma 3. For a given mechanism specified by (t(·), q(·)),
a better type of the seller produces more. That is, the
optimal quantity q∗(x) that the seller with true type x
wishes to produce satisfies the following properties:
a) ∂q
∗(x)
∂xi
≤ 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
b) ∂q
∗(x)
∂xi
≥ 0,m < x ≤ n.
In the appendix we show that a consequence of corollary
1 and Lemma 3 is the following result.
Corollary 2. The VP constraint is satisfied if t(0)=C(0,x)
and the lowest seller’s type payment is equal to her ex-
pected production cost, i.e. t(q(x))=EW{C(q(x),W, x)}.
Based on corollary 2, we define a problem (P4) that is
equivalent to (P3) and is only in terms of the marginal
price p(l) and the constraint that the payment the seller’s
lowest type receives is equal to her cost of production.
Problem (P4)
max
p(·)
∫ ∞
0
P [x ∈ χ|p(l) ≥ c(l, x)] (V ′(l)− p(l)) dl (17)
subject to
VP: C(0, x) +
∫ q(x)
0
p(l)dl = EW [C(q(x),W, x)] .(18)
6This relies on quasi-concavity of the seller’s optimal decision pro-
gram. This is a standard assumption in the literature, e.g. see [10]
and [19]. Basically, it gives the seller the freedom to decide for each
marginal unit of production independently. Therefore, the continuity of
the resulting generation quantity must be checked posterior to the design
of the optimal contract for each type of the seller.
6Step 7. We consider a relaxed version of (P4) without
the VP constraint (62). The unconstrained problem can
be solved point-wise at each quantity l to determine the
optimal p(l) as
p(l) = argmax
pˆ
{P [x∈χ|pˆ ≥ c(q, x)](V ′(q)− pˆ)}(19)
which is the same as (5). We show in the appendix that the
solution to the unconstrained problem automatically satis-
fies the VP constraint (62), therefore, the solution to the
unconstrained problem determines the optimal marginal
price p(·) for the original problem. Using p(·) and the fact
that t(0) = C(0, x), we determine the optimal function
t(·). Using t(·) we find the seller’s best response func-
tion q∗(·). By incentive compatibility q∗(·) = q(·), and
this completely determines the optimal direct revelation
mechanism (q(·), t(·)) described by Theorem 1.
In essence, Theorem 1 states that at each quantity
l, the optimal marginal price p(l) is chosen so as to
maximize the expected total marginal utility at l, which
is given by the total marginal utility (V ′(l)− p(l)) times
the probability that the seller generates at least l.
Remark 1. In a setup with startup cost for the seller, it
might not be optimal for the buyer to require all the seller’s
types to voluntarily participate in the energy procurement
process, since the minimum payment t(0) depends on the
production cost of the seller’s worst type. In such cases,
it might be optimal for the buyer to exclude some “less
efficient” types of the seller from the contract, select an
admissible set of seller’s types, and then design the optimal
contract for this admissible set of the seller’s types7. Note
that, this is not the case for setups without startup cost.
In such setups, if it is not optimal for some type x to be
included in the optimal contract, it is equivalent to have
q(x) = 0 for the optimal contract that considers all types
of the seller.
Remark 2. In problem (P1), we assume that there exists
a seller’s worst type which has the highest cost at any
quantity among all the seller’s types, and we reduce the
VP constraint for all the seller’s type to only the VP
constraint for this worst type. As a result, we pin down
the optimal payment function by setting t(0) = C(0, x)
to ensure the voluntary participation of the worst type,
which consequently implies the voluntary participation for
all the seller’s types. In absence of the assumption on the
existence of the seller’s worst type, the argument used to
reduce the VP constraint is not valid anymore and we
cannot pin down the payment function and specify t(0)
7To find the optimal admissible set, the optimal contract can be
computed for different potential admissible sets. Then, the resulting
utilities can be compared to find the best admissible set.
a priori. Assuming that all types of the seller participate
in the contract, their decision on the optimal quantity q∗
only depends on the marginal price p(q), and therefore,
the optimal marginal price p(q) given by (63) is still
valid without the assumption on the existence of the worst
type. To pin down the payment function t(·), we find the
minimum payment t(0) a posteriori so that all types of the
seller voluntarily participate. That is,
t(0) = max
x∈χ
[
EW {C(q(x), w, x)} −
∫ q(x)
0
p(q)dq
]
(20)
where the optimal decision of type x is given by
q(x) = argmax
q
[∫ q
0
p(q)− EW {C(q, w, x)}
]
. (21)
IV. EXAMPLE
Consider a seller with a conventional plant and a wind
turbine. The wind turbine’s output power curve g(w) is
as in figure 1. We assume that for wind speeds between
vci and vr the energy generation is given by γw3, where
γ captures the technology and size of the turbine. Energy
generation remains constant for wind speeds between vr
and vco, and is zero otherwise.
Fig. 1: Example - the wind turbine generation curve
We assume that there is a fixed marginal operational cost
θw for the wind turbine and a fixed marginal operational
cost θc for the conventional plant. There is a no-production
cost c0 that captures the start-up cost for both plants and
the capital cost for the seller. Therefore, the seller’s type
x = (c0, θw, θc, vci, vr,vco,γ) is 7-dimensional and her
total cost is given by
C(q, w,x)=c0+θwmin{q, g(w)}+θcmax{q−g(w),0},(22)
where g(w) is as in figure 1. The wind profile is a class
k=3 Weibull distribution with average speed 5m/s.
We only consider 6 types for the seller here:
a=(c0=4, θw=0.2, θc=1.2, vci=3, vr=13, vco=20, γ=1),
b=(c0=4, θw=0.2, θc=1.2, vci=3, vr=13, vco=20, γ=2),
c=(c0=5, θw=0.1, θc=1.2, vci=3, vr=13, vco=20, γ=1),
d=(c0=5, θw=0.2, θc=1.0, vci=1, vr=17, vco=28, γ=2),
e=(c0=6, θw=0.1, θc=1.0, vci=1, vr=17, vco=28, γ=1),
f=(c0=6, θw=0.1, θc=1.0, vci=1, vr=13, vco=28, γ=2),
7where the cost unit is $1000 and the energy unit is MWh,
and there is no worst type. The optimal contract from
Theorem 1 is depicted in Figure 2. It is a nonlinear
pricing scheme. The marginal price varies between 0.33
and 0.45 $/KWh. The variation in the marginal price is of
the same order as the variation in the expected marginal
production cost across the seller’s different types. Since
Fig. 2: Example - the optimal pricing scheme
there is no complete order among the different seller’s
types, we can not compare the seller’s types based on the
expected revenue or amount of production prior to the
design of the mechanism. However, wherever we have a
partial order and can rank a subset of types, we can utilize
Lemmas 1 and 3 to predict a ranking a priori. For instance,
the seller with type (b) is better than the one with type
(a), and we can say a priori that the former has a higher
production and revenue. However, we cannot order types
(b) and (c). For the setup of our example, according to the
optimal contract, type (c) gets a higher expected revenue
than type (b) but produces a lower amount of energy than
type (b).
V. DISCUSSION
The optimal mechanism/contract for the energy pro-
curement problem formulated in this paper is a nonlinear
pricing scheme. The nonlinearity is due to three factors.
First, the buyer’s utility function V(q) is not linear in the
quantity q. Second, for each type of the seller, the cost
of production is a nonlinear function of the amount of
produced energy. Third, the seller has private information
about her technology and cost (seller’s type).
The uncertainty about the production from the non-
conventional plant makes the total expected production
cost function nonlinear even with a fixed marginal cost
of production for conventional and renewable plants. The
buyer has to pay information rent (monetary incentive)
to the seller to incentivize her to reveal her true type.
Therefore, the payment the buyer makes to the seller
includes the cost of production the seller incurs plus the
information rent, which varies with the seller’s type; the
better the seller’s type, the higher is the information rent.
The optimal contract/mechanism discovered in this pa-
per can be implemented indirectly (without reporting the
seller’s private information) as follows: the buyer offers
the seller a menu of contracts (nonlinear pricing scheme);
the seller chooses one of these contracts based on her type,
and there is no need for an implausible and unnecessary
information exchange stage between the seller and the
buyer.
The multi-dimensionality of the seller’s private infor-
mation could be due to the different types of energy
generators that she owns, or because of a complex cost
function with more than one parameter (even with one
type of energy generator). The solution approach presented
in this paper can be used to solve problems with multi-
dimensional private information with similar structure.
The optimal contract defined by Theorem 1 also in-
duces some incentives for investment in infrastructure and
technology development. From Lemma 1, the seller with
the higher type has a higher utility. Therefore, there is
an incentive for the seller to improve her technology and
decrease her cost of generation.
It is well-known that in the presence of private in-
formation and strategic behavior, in general, there exists
no mechanism/contract that is (1) individually rational,
(2) incentive compatible, and (3) efficient (Pareto-optimal
generally) [14]. In the optimal contract/mechanism given
by Theorem 1, the allocation for the seller’s different
types is not ex-post efficient (Pareto-optimal) except for
the seller’s worst type who gets zero utility.
VI. FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS
A. Commitment and Ex-post Voluntary Participation
The voluntary participation constraint imposed in prob-
lem (P1) is interim. That is, the expected profit with
respect to the weather for each type of the seller must be
non-negative. By assumption (A9), once the seller agrees
on the contract (this agreement takes place before the
realization of the weather) she is fully committed to fol-
lowing the agreement, even if the realized profit is negative
(because of the realization of the weather)8. To ensure that
the seller’s realized profit is non-negative for all weather
realizations, we impose an ex-post voluntary participation
constraint. We replace the interim VP constraint (7) by
Ex-post VP: t(m∗)− C(q, w, x) ≥ 0,∀w, ∀x∈χ. (23)
To obtain an ex-post voluntary participation constraint,
we modify the payment function of the mechanism given
by Theorem 1 as follows:
8Since the seller’s reserve utility is zero by not participating (outside
option), we can always think of the seller walks away from the agreement
for these negative profit realizations and not follow the mechanism rules.
8t˜(q, w)=t(q)− t(q(x)) + C(q(x), w, x). (24)
We have EW
{
t˜(q, w)
}
= t(q), and therefore, the seller
always chooses the same quantity q under the modified
payment function t˜(·) as under the original payment func-
tion t(q) given by (29). Note that for the seller’s worst
type, we have t˜(q(x),w) = C(q(x),w, x), and therefore,
the total utility of the seller’s worst type is zero for all
realizations of W . Since all other types of the seller are
better off than the worst type under t˜(·) (all types have the
choice to produce the same quantity as the worst type) ,
the ex-post VP constraint is satisfied for all of the seller’s
types.
B. Risk Allocation
In the optimal mechanism/contract menu presented by
Theorem 1, the buyer faces no uncertainty, and he is
guaranteed to receive quantity q(x), and all the risk
associated with the realization of the weather is taken by
the seller. We wish to modify the mechanism to reallocate
the above-mentioned risk between the buyer and the seller.
To do so, we modify the payment function so that the risk
is reallocated between the buyer and the seller. Consider
the following modified payment function with α∈[0, 1],
tˆ(x,w) = t(q(x)) + α [C(q(x), w, x)
−EW {C(q(x), w, x)}] . (25)
From (25) it follows that EW
{
tˆ(x,w)
}
= t(q(x)). There-
fore, the strategic behavior of the seller does not change
and the seller chooses the same quantity under the modi-
fied payment function tˆ(·) as under the original payment
function t(q) given by (29). Note that for α = 0 we
have the same payment as t(q). For α = 1, the seller is
completely insured against any risk and all the risk is taken
by the buyer. The parameter α determines the allocation
of the risk between the buyer and the seller; the buyer
undertakes α and the seller undertakes (1 − α) share of
the risk.
VII. CONCLUSION
We proposed a model for energy procurement that
captures the current approach for integration of modern
renewable and conventional energy resources and takes
into account the fact that renewable energy producers
behave strategically and may have different production
technologies. We analyzed an arbitration between a strate-
gic energy buyer and a strategic energy seller who has
the ability to generate energy from a conventional plant
and a modern renewable plant and has private information
about her production technology and cost. We showed that
the optimal contract/mechanism for energy procurement
is a nonlinear pricing scheme. The originally proposed
mechanism guarantees interim voluntary participation of
the seller. By modifying the seller’s payment so as to
be weather-dependent we achieved ex-post voluntary par-
ticipation of the seller. We also presented an alternative
payment to the seller that divides the risk (due to the
uncertainty in the weather) between the buyer and the
seller.
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9APPENDIX
DETAILS AND PROOFS OF THE RESULTS
Consider the following problem (P1) formulated in the
paper. Problem (P1):
maximize
(M,(q,t))
EX,W {V(q)− t} (26)
subject to
VP: t(m∗)−EW{C(q(m∗),W, x)}≥0,∀x∈χ. (27)
where {M, (q, t).q :M→R+, t :M→R+} denotes the
mechanism to be designed, and the notation in (1) and (2)
is the same as in the paper.
The main result in the paper is given by Theorem 1
stated below.
Theorem 2. The optimal mechanism (q, t) for the buyer
is a menu of contracts (nonlinear pricing) given by
p(q) = argmax
pˆ
{P [x ∈ χ|pˆ ≥ c(q, x)] (V ′(q)− pˆ)},(28)
t(q) =
∫ q
0
p(l)dl + C(0, x), (29)
q(x) = arg max
l∈R+
E {t (l)− EW {C(l, x, w)}} . (30)
In this note, we provide all the details of the proof of
Theorem 1 that were left out of the presentation in the
paper due to lack of space. We follow the same steps as
in the paper.
Proof:
We proceed to solve (P1) and prove theorem 1 by the
following steps.
Step 1. By invoking the revelation principle [4], we
restrict attention, without loss of optimality, to direct rev-
elation mechanisms that are incentive compatible (defined
below) and individually rational (individual rationality is
equivalent to voluntary participation).
Definition 3. A direct revelation mechanism is defined by
functions q : χ → R+ and t : χ → R+. and works as
follows:
• First, the buyer announces functions q and t.
• Second, the seller declares some x′ ∈ χ as her report
for her type.
• Third, the seller is paid t(x′) to deliver q(x′) amount
of energy.
Note that the seller is strategic and may lie and misre-
port her private information x, i.e. we do not necessarily
have x′ = x.
The revelation principle: For any BNE m˜∗ of the
game induced by an arbitrary mechanism (M˜, (q˜, t˜)),
there exists an equivalent direct revelation mechanism
(χ, (q, t)), in which truthful reporting is a BNE of the
game induced by (χ, (q, t)), and the players’ allocation
and payment associated with the truth-telling equilibrium
are identical to those associated with the BNE m˜∗ of the
original mechanism (M˜, (q˜, t˜)).
In essence, by invoking the revelation principle we
eliminate the problem of finding the optimal message
spaceM by restricting attention to direct revelation mech-
anisms (M := χ), and impose a new set of incentive
compatibility (IC) constraints. As a result, we can solve the
following problem (P2) to find an optimal direct revelation
mechanism.
Problem P2: Determine functions q : χ → R+ and
t : χ→ R+ so as to
maximize
(q,t)
EX,W {V(q(X))− t(X)} (31)
subject to:
IC: x=argmax
x′
EW [t(x′)−C(q(x′),W, x)] ,∀x∈χ,(32)
V P : EW [t(x)− C(q(x),W, x)] ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ χ. (33)
Step 2. We utilize the partial order among the seller’s
different types to order the seller’s resulting utility for her
different types and reduce the VP constraint for all of the
seller’s types to the VP constraint only for the seller’s
worst type.
Lemma 4. For a given incentive compatible mechanism
(q, t), a better type of the seller gets a higher utility. That
is, let U(x) := EW {t(q(x))− C(q(x),W, x)} denote the
expected profit of the seller with type x. Then,
1) ∂U∂xi ≤ 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
2) ∂U∂xi ≥ 0,m < i ≤ n.
Proof of lemma 1: The given mechanism (q, t) is
incentive compatible, so we can rewrite U(x) as
U(x) = max
x′
EW {t(q(x′))− C(q(x′),W, x)} (34)
By applying the envelope theorem [12] on (34), we get
∂U
∂xi
= − ∂EW {C(q(x
′),W, x)}
xi
∣∣∣∣
x′=x
. (35)
The above equation along with assumption (A5) on the
marginal expected cost, gives
∂U
∂xi
≤ 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ m (36)
∂U
∂xi
≥ 0,m < i ≤ n (37)
10
A direct consequence of Lemma 1 is the following.
Corollary 3. The voluntary participation constraint, is
satisfied if and only if it is satisfied for the worst type
x, that is the general VP constraint (8) can be reduced to
U(x) = EW {t(q(x))− C(q(x),W, x)} ≥ 0. (38)
Step 3. We show, via lemma 2 below, that without loss
of optimality, we can restrict attention to a set of functions
t(·) that depend only on the amount of delivered energy
q. That is, the optimal mechanism is a pricing scheme.
Lemma 5. For any given pair of functions (q, t) that sat-
isfies the IC constraint, we can rewrite t(x′) as t (q(x′)).
Proof of lemma 2: The proof is by contradiction.
Assume that there exist x, x′ ∈ χ such that q(x) = q(x′)
but t(x′) > t(x). Then a seller with type x is always
better off by reporting x′ instead of her true type x, which
contradicts the IC constraint.
Step 4. As a consequence of lemma 5, we determine an
optimal mechanism sequentially. First, we determine the
optimal payment function t(·), then the optimal energy
procurement function q(·).
For any given pair of functions (q, t), a seller with true
type x solves the following maximization problem to find
her optimal report x′∗,
x′∗ = argmax
x′
EW {t (q(x′))− C(q(x′),W, x)} . (39)
Considering the solution of (39) for every type x∈χ,
we can form a function q∗ : χ −→ R+ defined by
q∗(x) := argmax
l
EW {t (l)− C(l,W, x)} . (40)
For a given direct revelation mechanism, the function q∗(·)
defines the optimal quantity of energy procured from each
type of the seller. Incentive compatibility then requires that
the seller must tell the truth to achieve this optimal value,
and cannot do better by lying, i.e.
q(x) = q∗(x) ∀x ∈ χ. (41)
The function q∗(·) is induced only by t(·) through (40),
and therefore, (41) can be taken as the definition for the
associated function q(·) that along with t(·) satisfies the set
of IC constraints. Thus, we can eliminate the IC constraint
by defining q(·) := q∗(·) and reduce the problem of
designing the optimal direct revelation mechanism (q, t)
to an equivalent problem (P2’) where we determine only
the optimal payment function t(·) subject to the voluntary
participation constraint for the worst type.
Problem P2’: Determine function t : R+ → R+ so as
to
maximize
t(·)
EX {V(q∗(X))− t(q∗(X))} (42)
subject to
VP: EW [t(q(x))−C(q∗(x),W, x)]≥0, (43)
where q∗ is given by (40).
Step 5. To solve problem (P2’), we show that the
optimal decision of the seller for amount of power q∗
depends only on the marginal price p(q) := ∂t(q)∂q and
express the buyer’s expected utility in term of the marginal
price.
Consider the buyer’s objective (42). For any function
t(·), we can determine from (40) the cumulative distri-
bution function for q∗, called Fq∗ . Consequently, we can
rewrite the buyer’s objective as
Eq∗ [V(q∗)− t(q∗)] =
∫ ∞
0
(V(l)− t(l)) dFq∗(l)
= (Fq∗(l)− 1) (V(l)− t(l))|∞0
+
∫ ∞
0
(1− Fq∗(l)) d (V(l)− t(l))
dl
dl. (44)
We have
(Fq∗(l)− 1) (V(l)− t(l))|∞0 = −t(0) (45)
because V(0) = 0 by assumption, and (Fq∗(∞)− 1) = 0.
Because of (45), we can rewrite (44) as
Eq∗ [V(q∗)− t(q∗)] =
∫ ∞
0
P (q∗ ≥ l) (V ′(l)− p(l)) dl
−t(0) (46)
where V ′(l) = dV(l)dl .
We can rewrite P (q∗ ≥ l) as
P (q∗≥l)=P [x∈χ|argmax
l
EW{t(q)−C(q(x),W,x)}≥l].
(47)
We implicitly assume that the seller’s problem given by
(40) is continuous and quasi-concave9, so that from the
first order optimality condition for (40) we obtain
p(q∗(x)) =
∂EW {C(l,W, x)}
∂l
∣∣∣∣
q∗(x)
. (48)
9This is a standard assumption in literature, e.g. see [10] and [19].
Basically, it can be seen as a situation where the seller can decide for
each marginal unit of production independently. Therefore, in general,
there is no guarantee that the seller’s independent decisions about each
marginal unit of production results in a continuous and plausible total
production quantity q. Therefore, the continuity of the result must be
checked posteriori for each type of the seller.
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Therefore, each type of the seller wishes to produce more
than quantity l if and only if the marginal price p(q) that
she is paid at l is higher than the expected marginal cost
of production c(l, x) that she incurs at l. Consequently,
combining (47) and (48) we obtain
P (q∗ ≥ l) = P
[
x∈χ|p(l) ≥ ∂EW {C(l,W, x)}
∂l
]
. (49)
Substituting (49) in (46), we obtain the following alter-
native expression for the buyer’s objective
Eq∗ [V(q∗)−t(q∗)]=
∫ ∞
0
P
[
x∈χ|p(l)≥ ∂EW{C(l,W,x)}
∂l
]
(V ′(l)−p(l)) dl− t(0). (50)
The buyer seeks to determine the marginal price p(·)
and t(0) to maximize the right hand side of (50), subject
to the VP constraint for the seller’s worst type. Based on
this consideration, we define the following problem (P3)
that is equivalent to problem (P2’).
Problem P3:
maximize
p(·),t(0)
− t(0)+
∫ ∞
0
P
[
x∈χ|p(l)≥ ∂EW{C(l, w, x)}
∂l
]
(V ′(l)− p(l)) dl (51)
subject to
VP: max
l
t(0)+
∫ q∗(x)
0
p(r)dr−EW{C(q∗(x),W, x)}≥0.(52)
Step 6. We provide a ranking for the seller’s optimal
decision q∗(x) based on the partial order among the
seller’s types via the following lemma.
Lemma 6. For a given mechanism specified by (t(·), q(·)),
a better type of the seller produces more. That is, the
optimal quantity q∗(x) that the seller with true type x
wishes to produce satisfies the following properties:
a) ∂q
∗(x)
∂xi
≤ 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
b) ∂q
∗(x)
∂xi
≥ 0,m < x ≤ n.
Proof of lemma 3: Let x, x′ ∈ χ, where x is a better
type than x′. From IC for seller’s type x we have
t(q(x))−EW{C(q(x),W, x)}
≥
t(q(x′))−EW{C(q(x′),W, x)} (53)
Similarly from IC for seller’s type x′ we have
t(q(x′))− EW {C(q(x′),W, x′)}
≥
t(q(x))− EW {C(q(x),W, x′)} (54)
Subtracting (54) from (53), we get
EW {C(q(x),W, x′)} − EW {C(q(x′),W, x′)}
≥
EW {C(q(x),W, x)} − EW {C(q(x′),W, x)} (55)
By assumption (A4), dEW{C(q,W,x)}dq ≤
dEW{C(q,W,x′)}
dq if x
is a better type than x′. Therefore, (55) holds if and only
if
q(x) ≥ q(x′). (56)
The following result is a consequence of corollary 1 and
lemma 3.
Corollary 4. The VP constraint is satisfied if t(0) =
C(0, x) and the lowest seller’s type is paid exactly
equal to her expected production cost, i.e. t(q(x)) =
EW {C(q(x),W, x)}.
Proof of corollary 2: Because of corollary 1, the VP
constraint implies
U(x) = t(q(x))− EW [C(q∗(x),W, x)] = 0, (57)
which is equivalent to
t(0) +
∫ q∗(x)
0
p(l)dl = EW [C(q∗(x),W, x)] . (58)
Furthermore, from Lemma 3 it follows that if the worst
type wishes to produce more than q∗(x), then all types
produce more than q∗(x). Therefore,
P [x ∈ χ|p(l) ≥ c(l, x)] = 1, for l ≤ q∗(x). (59)
Using (59), we can rewrite the objective function of
problem (P3) as,
−
(
t(0) +
∫ q∗(x)
0
p(l)dl
)
+
∫ q∗(x)
0
V ′(l)dl
+
∫ ∞
q∗(x)
P [x ∈ χ|p(l) ≥ c(l, x)] (V ′(l)− p(l)) dl.(60)
The term t(0)+
∫ q∗(x)
0
p(l)dl appears in both the objec-
tive (60) and the VP constraint (58). Therefore, without
loss of optimality, we can assume t(0) = C(0, x), and set
t(q(x)) = EW {C(q(x),W, x)}.
Using corollary 2, we define a problem (P4) that is
equivalent to (P3) and is only in terms of the marginal
price p(·) and the constraint that the payment the seller’s
lowest type receives is equal to her cost of production.
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Problem (P4)
max
p(·)
∫ ∞
0
P [x ∈ χ|p(l) ≥ c(l, x)] (V ′(l)− p(l)) dl (61)
subject to
VP: C(0, x) +
∫ q∗(x)
0
p(l)dl=EW [C(q∗(x), w, x)].(62)
Step 7. We consider a relaxed version of (P4) with-
out the VP constraint (62). The unconstrained prob-
lem (P4) can be solved by maximizing the integrand
P [x ∈ χ|p(l) ≥ c(l, x)] (V ′(l)− p(l)) point-wise at each
quantity l. The solution of the point-wise maximization
problem for the optimal marginal price p(·) is given by,
p(l)= argmax
pˆ
{P [x ∈ χ|pˆ ≥ c(q, x)] (V ′(q)− pˆ)}.(63)
Using (59), along with the the fact that the worst type has
the highest expected marginal cost, we can simplify (63)
for l ≤ q∗(x),
p(l) = c(l, x), for l ≤ q∗(x). (64)
That is, for l ≤ q∗(x), the minimum marginal price p(l)
that ensures all the seller’s type are willing to produce
more than q∗(x) is equal to the marginal expected cost for
the seller’s worst type c(l, x). Therefore, the solution to the
unconstrained version of problem (P4) satisfies condition
(62) of problem (P4), and therefore, (63) (which is the
same as (3)) is also the optimal solution of problem (P4).
From Corollary 2 and (63), the optimal payment func-
tion (nonlinear pricing) is given by,
t(q) =
∫ q
0
p(l)dl + C(0, x) (65)
which is the same as (4). From (40) we determine the
optimal energy procurement function,
q(x) = argmax
l
E {t (l)− C(l, w, x)} (66)
which us the as (5). The specification of t(·) and q(·)
completes the proof of theorem 1 and the solution to
problem (P1).
